

# Slipping into Authoritarianism: How Oil Discoveries feed the Natural Resource Curse

S.P.Harish & Joseph Levine

College of William & Mary, IGC & WUR

American Political Science Association Conference  
Seattle, September 2021

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  - Ignores the mechanism of military coups

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- Particularly the case for autocratic countries
- '[f]or every Venezuela and Nigeria, there is a Norway or a Botswana' (Robinson et al. 2006: 451)
- **Argument:** Autocratic leaders use natural resource discoveries to reduce the likelihood of a coup by buying off the military

# Hypotheses

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*(Bigger) oil discoveries increases levels of military spending, especially in autocracies*

# Data

- Discovery data from Horn (2004)
- Dataset of giant oilfields including information on location, historic production and discovery year
- Better than other sources (in terms of time coverage and information on size)
- Good for our purposes (wide variation in time and space) [▶ Link](#)
- Has information on estimated oil recovery as well
- Main measures:
  - Number of discoveries in a year
  - Total estimated oil recovery
- Also use Polity, VDEM, SIPRI
- Country-Year panel

# Estimation Strategy

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{Number of Discoveries}_{it} + X_{it} + \gamma_i + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

$$Y_{it} = \psi_0 + \psi_1 * \text{Total Estimated Oil}_{it} + X_{it} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + \omega_{it}$$


- where  $Y_{it}$  is the outcome for country  $i$  and year  $t$
- $\text{Number of Discoveries}_{it}$  is the number of oil field discoveries and  $\text{Total Estimated Oil}_{it}$  is the amount of estimated oil from a discovery in country  $i$  and year  $t$
- $X_{it}$  is a matrix of control variables: Population, Oil Reserves, Country Area, Total Oil Income, Civil War
- $\gamma_i$  and  $\alpha_i$  are country fixed effects
- $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_t$  are year fixed effects

# Results

- Oil Discovery & Democracy [▶ Link](#)
- Estimated Oil Recovery & Democracy
- Oil Discovery & Coups [▶ Link](#)
- Estimated Oil Coups & Democracy
- Oil Discovery & Military Spending [▶ Link](#)
- Estimated Oil Coups & Military Spending




# Oil Discovery & Democracy




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# Oil Discovery & Coups




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# Estimated Oil Recovery & Coups



Back to Results [▶ Link](#)

# Oil Discovery & Military Spending



Back to Results [▶ Link](#)

Thank you!

# Oil Discoveries

## Countries with Giant Discoveries (1945-2014)

1945 - 1954



1955 - 1964



1965 - 1974



1975 - 1984



1985 - 1994



1995 - 2004



2005 - 2014



Discovery




Discovery

No Discovery

Back to Data [▶ Link](#)

# Oil Discoveries



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